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UNSEAWORTHINESS, OPERATIONAL NEGLIGENCE, AND THE DEATH OF THE
LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT.
I. Remedies Available to Longshoremen
A. Introduction
Probably no worker in America is better protected from the financial losses
of a work-connected injury than the longshoreman, and no industry is more
obligated to pay for such protection than the American shipping industry. This
situation has resulted from a long, stumbling development that has left the
ordinary longshoreman who is injured in the course of his employment with
not one, but three grounds for recovery. First, under the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Act of 1927' [hereinafter referred to as "Longshoremen's
Act"], he has a workmen's compensation type remedy against the stevedore,
his immediate employer, for recovery of damages within certain prescribed limits.
Second, he may well be able to obtain unlimited damages from the owner of
the ship on which he was working on the negligence theory of failure to provide
a safe place for a business invitee to work. Third, and most significantly, he
quite likely will be able to recover unlimited damages from the owner of the
ship under strict liability principles if he can show that his injury was caused
by the unseaworthy condition of the ship. As is apparent, the longshoreman
today, like the seaman of yesteryear, is certainly a favorite ward of the courts.2
The development of these remedies has been traced by a number of com-
mentators3 so that only a brief review will be given here. However, this develop-
ment is not yet complete and a number of problems still remain. One particular
difficulty has been whether the "actionable negligence" of longshoremen in their
use of previously sound equipment aboard ship, resulting in injury to one of
their fellows, makes the vessel itself unseaworthy and the vessel's owner absolutely
liable for damages to the injured party.4 Before analyzing some of the most
recent authority on this issue, it will be necessary to again briefly trace the
remedies available to an injured longshoreman in light of the underlying public,
policies.
B. The Employment Situation
Important to an understanding of this field of law is an appreciation of the
classical relationships among the parties. A shipping firm, usually called the
shipowner, will hire a stevedoring firm, normally referred to as the stevedore,
to carry out the desired tasks, traditionally the loading and unloading of the
1 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1964), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 943 (Supp. I, 1965).
2 See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, TE LAW OF ADMIRALTY §§ 6-6 to 6-8, at 253-61
(1957); Tetreault, Seamen, Seaworthiness, and the Rights of Harbor Workers, 39 CORNELL
L.Q. 381 (1954).
3 G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 2, §§ 6-1 to 6-64, at 248-394; M. NoRIs, TIE
LAw OF MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES (2d ed. 1966); Bue, Admiralty Law in the Filth
Circuit - A Compendium for Practitioners: I, 4 Hous. L. REv. 347 (1966); Tetreault, supra
note 2.
4 M. NoRRIs, supra note 3, § 38, at 75.
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ship. The stevedore will employ a number of workers, usually longshoremen, to
carry out these operations. Other tasks may require the services of repairmen
or other harbor workers. Either the shipowner will hire them directly or engage
independent contractors who will bring aboard a crew of workers. The essential
relationship is that of shipowner, stevedore and longshoreman, with the ship-
owner engaging the stevedoring firm to handle cargo, and the stevedore employ-
ing the longshoreman to do the actual work.
C. The Negligence Remedy
The longshoreman's oldest remedy is based upon the pure tort principle
of negligence under which the injured worker could either sue the shipowner
for failing to keep the vessel reasonably safe for business invitees5 or the employing
stevedore for failing to provide him with a reasonably safe place in which to
work.' The exclusive liability provisions of the Longshoremen's Act,' however,
have ended direct suits by the longshoreman against his employer, the stevedore,
for failure to provide a safe working place. But Pope & Talbot, Incorporated v.
Hawn' reaffirmed the right of a harbor worker to bring an action under ordinary
negligence principles against the shipowner.
The duty imposed on the shipowner is said to be "a nondelegable obliga-
tion that reasonable care shall be used"' to make the vessel safe for business
5 The Helios, 12 F. 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1882); Gerrity v. The Bark Kate Cann, 2 F. 241
(E.D.N.Y. 1880). In Leathers v. Blessing, 105 U.S. 626 (1882), the Supreme Court affirmed
the jurisdiction of admiralty over a tort suit charging negligent injury to a business invitee
on board ship.
6 Atlantic Transp. Co. v. Inbrovek, 234 U.S. 52 (1914). See Porello v. United States,
153 F.2d 605, 608 (2d Cir. 1946), modified, 330 U.S. 446 '(1947), where it was said that
"[t]he primary duty to furnish its employees a safe place to work rested on the stevedore."
7 § 905. Exclusiveness of liability.
The liability of an employer prescribed in section 904 of this title shall be
exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee, his
legal representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone
otherwise entitled to recover damages from such employer at law or in admiralty
on account of such injury or death .... 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1964).
8 346 U.S. 406 (1953). The Longshoremen's Act itself makes provision for suits against
third parties
§ 933. Compensation for injuries where third parties are liable.
(a) If on account of a disability or death for which compensation is payable
under this chapter the person entitled to such compensation determines that some
person other than the employer or a person or persons in his employ is liable in
damages, he need not elect whether to receive such compensation or to recover
damages against such third person.
(b) Acceptance of such compensation under an award in a compensation
order filed by the deputy commissioner shall operate as an assignment to the
employer of all right of the person entitled to compensation to recover damages
against such third person unless such person shall commence an action against
such third person within six months after such award.
(i) The right to compensation or benefits under this chapter shall be the
exclusive remedy to an employee when he is injured, or to his eligible survivors
or legal representatives if he is killed, by the negligence or wrong of any other person
or persons in the same employ: Provided, That this provision shall not affect the
liability of a person other than an: officer or employee of the employer.
33 U.S.C. § 933 (1964).
9 West v. United States, 256 F.2d 671, 672 '(3d Cir. 1958), aff'd, 361 U.S. 118 (1959).
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invitees, and the traditional principles of negligence seem to apply, including
the fact that the defendant shipowner, to be liable, must have possession and
control of the vessel.1" A longshoreman, however, cannot assume the risk of
negligence or unseaworthiness,"" and while contributory negligence does not
bar recovery, it can act to mitigate damages as justice requires.'"
D. The Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of 1927
In the same year that state workmen's compensation acts were first
sustained on constitutional grounds, the Supreme Court ruled that they cannot
be constitutionally applied to a workman injured on shipboard while performing
maritime work." The result is based on the multiple grounds that the consti-
tutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts is exclusive and that
congressional power to modify maritime law would be defeated and the con-
stitutionally prescribed uniformity and consistency in admiralty matters would
be violated.' 4 Congressional opinion, however, was that the best policy would
be to apply state compensation statutes to maritime workers,' 5 and the Congress
twice tried to do so through amendments to the "saving to suitors clause"'"
only to have their attempts ruled unconstitutional as invalid attempts to delegate
federal power.' 7
It was then apparent that Congress would have to provide a federal act
if it wanted maritime workers to be covered by workmen's compensation type
remedies. Hastened by what appeared to be an unfavorable policy change
evidenced by the Supreme Court's extension of Jones Act rights to harbor
workers,'" Congress passed the Longshoremen's Act.'9 This Act granted com-
pensation for disability or death to any employee, according to fixed scales that
were generally more liberal than those under state compensation acts. 2' The
Act applied to any injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United
10 McDonald v. United States, 321 F.2d 437 (3d Cir. 1963).
11 Klimaszewski v. Pacific-Atlantic S.S. Co., 246 F.2d 875 (3d Cir. 1957).
Any rule of assumption of risk in admiralty, whatever its scope, must be
applied in conjunction with the established admiralty doctrine of comparative
negligence and in harmony with it. Under that doctrine contributory negligence,
however gross, is not a bar to recovery but only mitigates damages.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 431 (1939). This holding in Socony
was extended to cover longshoremen in Pope & Talbot, Incorporated v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406,
409 (1953).
12 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409 (1953).
13 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
14 Id.
15 G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 2, at 336.
16 Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 97, (entitled "An Act To amend Sections twenty-four and
two hundred and fifty-six of the Judicial Code, relating to the jurisdiction of the district
courts, so as to save to claimants the rights and remedies under the workmen's compensation
law of any state"), 40 Stat. 395; Act of June 10, 1922, ch. 216, 42 Stat. 634.
17 Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920) (overruling 1917 Act) and
Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 '(1924) (overruling 1922 Act).
18 International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926). Today it is clear
that harbor workers cannot sue shipowners under the Jones Act since it is limited to suits
against employers. Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783 (1949). The
Longshoremen's Act limits the harbor worker to the compensation remedy against his em-
ployer, the stevedore. See notes 7 and 8 supra and note 22 infra and accompanying text.
19 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1964), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 943 (Supp. I, 1965).
20 Bue, supra note 3, at 379; see 33 U.S.C. §§ 908-09 (1964).
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States except for injuries that would validly come under a state compensation
statute, or injuries to a master or member of the crew of a vessel, or to an of-
ficer or employee of the United States, or injuries incurred upon certain very
small ships, or injuries caused solely by the intoxication or willful intention of the
injured employee.21 As the quid pro quo for making the employing stevedore
absolutely liable, the Act, as is traditional with workmen's compensation statutes,
restricted the liability of the employer to the limited recovery available under its
terms.
22
E. The Unseaworthiness Remedy
The duty of a shipowner to seamen to provide a seaworthy ship was men-
tioned as early as 1789 in The Cyrus.2' Not until 1903, in the now classic caso
of The Osceola,24 was there recognition of a right of the injured seaman to
recover damages caused by the unseaworthiness of the ship. This alternative
remained a relatively unimportant remedy until the 1940's since the Jones Act
provided seamen a more attractive method of securing relief.2" Moreover, a
shipowner contesting an unseaworthiness action might defeat the claim by show-
ing that he had exercised due diligence to maintain the ship in a seaworthy
condition or by showing that the proximate cause of the injury was operating
negligence, a cause of action that could be brought only under the Jones Act.2"
In 1944 with the case of Mahnich v. Southern Steamship Company,"
the world turned upside down when Chief Justice Stone wrote:
[Tihe exercise of due diligence does not relieve the owner of his obliga-
tion to the seaman to furnish adequate appliances....
If the owner is liable for furnishing an unseaworthy appliance, even
when he is not negligent, a fortiori his obligation is unaffected by the fact
that the negligence of the officers of the vessel contributed to unsea-
worthiness.
We have often had occasion to emphasize the conditions of the seaman's
employment . . . which have been deemed to make him a ward of the
admiralty and to place large responsibility for his safety on the owner....
These conditions, which have generated the exacting requirement that
the vessel or the owner must provide the seaman with seaworthy appliances
with which to do his work, likewise require that safe appliances be fur-
nished when and where the work is to be done. 8
This holding made it clear that the shipowner's duty to provide a seaworthy
ship was not discharged by due diligence but was absolute. Regardless of whether
the unseaworthy condition was caused by the operating or actionable negligence
of another, the liability for injuries to seamen rested on the shipowner.
21 33 U.S.C. § 903 (1964).
22 Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 129 (1956). See
notes 7 and 8 supra.
23 Dixon v. The Cyrus, 7 F. Cas. 755 (No. 3,930) '(D. Pa. 1789).
24 189 U.S. 158 (1903).25 G. GILMORE & C. BLACx, supra note 2, § 6-3, at 250-51.
26 Id. § 6-3, at 250-51 and §§ 6-38 to 6-40, at 315-22.
27 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
28 Id. at 100, 103-04.
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A very significant extension of this doctrine occurred two years later in
Seas Shipping Company v. Sieracki29 when the Supreme Court ruled that the
remedy for injury caused by the unseaworthiness of a ship was available to long-
shoremen working aboard the ship even though they were employed by an
independent stevedoring contractor. This holding was made on the basis that
the liability was not contractual, but relational, in that it attached in favor of
anyone doing work that was traditionally performed by seamen."0 Thus sea-
worthiness has become an absolute nondelegable duty owed by the shipowner
to seamen and to anyone doing traditional seamen's work, including longshore-
men,"' to make the ship in every way reasonably fit for its intended purpose. 2
"The standard is not perfection, but reasonable fitness; not a ship that will
weather every conceivable storm or withstand every imaginable peril of the sea,
but a vessel reasonably suitable for her intended service.""3 The harbor worker,
injured aboard ship, can recover against the shipowner if he can show in any
way that his injury was caused by some man or element upon or connected
with the ship that was not reasonably suitable for its intended use, regardless
of who or what made it so unsuitable.
F. Indemnity and Policy
Since shipowners are liable to longshoremen for injuries caused by the
unseaworthiness of the ship regardless of whose fault the unseaworthiness might
have been, it was inevitable that situations would arise in which the unsea-
worthiness was due to some negligence or unsound device brought aboard by
the contracting stevedore. In such a case the injured longshoreman's remedy
against his employer is limited to that provided by the exclusive liability provisions
of the Longshoremen's Act, 4 but he is still able to seek a judgment against the
shipowner on the unseaworthiness count as the Longshoremen's Act did not
disturb the employee's right to recover damages from third persons. It was
only natural that a shipowner held absolutely liable in an unseaworthiness action
would in turn seek indemnity from the stevedore who was the cause of the;
unseaworthy condition.
In Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corporation' such
an indemnity claim by a shipowner was refused on the ground that there could
be no contribution among joint tort-feasors. It was not long, however, before
29 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
30 It [unseaworthiness] is essentially a species of liability without fault analogous to
other well known instances in our law. ]Derived from and shaped to meet the hazards
which performing the service imposes, the liability is neither limited by conceptions
of negligence nor contractual in character. ... It is a form of absolute duty owing
to all within the range of its humanitarian policy. Id. at 94-95.
31 Id. at 96, 99.
32 M. NORIS, supra note 3, § 29, at 57. "Simply stated, the concept of seaworthinessin personal injury matters contemplates that a ship's hull, gear, appliances, ways, appurtenances,
and manning will be reasonably fit for its intended purpose."
33 Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960).
34 See note 7 supra.
35 See note 8 supra; Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124,
129-30 '(1956); Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 102 (1946).
36 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
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the fundamental unfairness of a shipowner's being absolutely liable for unsea-
worthiness, when the condition was actually the fault of the protected stevedorej
caused the courts to find a way around Haenn. In Ryan Stevedoring Company
v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corporation7 the employing stevedoring firm had
to indemnify the shipowner for the amount of the judgment obtained by an
employee of the stevedoring firm from the shipowner. The cause of the injury
had been falling cargo that struck a longshoreman who was helping unload the
vessel. The cargo had been improperly stowed by the stevedoring firm when
they had loaded the vessel, thus making the ship unseaworthy. The Court held
the shipowner entitled to reinbursement, despite the exclusive liability provisions
of the Longshoremen's Act, on the ground that the stevedore had breached
an implied warranty of workmanship.3" The Court stated:
While the Compensation Act protects a stevedoring contractor from ac-
tions brought against it by its employee on account of the contractor's tortious
conduct causing injury to the employee, the contractor has no logical
ground for relief from the full consequences of its independent contractual
obligation, voluntarily assumed to the shipowner, to load the cargo
properly3 9
Without further laboring the issue, a brief review of the remedies available
to longshoremen and their ramifications are:
1) Under the Longshoremen's Act, the injured worker can obtain work-
men's compensation type recovery from his employer. 2) As always the long-
shoreman can sue the shipowner under ordinary negligence principles for failing
to keep the vessel reasonably safe for a business invitee, but he cannot sue his
employing stevedore for failing to provide him with a safe place to work because
of the exclusive liability provisions of the Longshoremen's Act. 3) In a great
many instances, the worker will be able to show that in some way the injury
was caused by somebody or something that was not reasonably fit for its intended
purpose (seaworthy) and, since the longshoreman regularly works on a ship
owned by a third party shipowner,4" his action against such a shipowner will
be valid despite the Longshoremen's Act. 4) In a number of situations where
the shipowner has been held absolutely liable, it will appear that the unsea-
worthy condition was due to the failure of the stevedore employer to fulfill his
express or implied warranty to the shipowner of workmanlike performance.
In such a case the shipowner will be able to obtain indemnity from the stevedore
in the amount of the judgment in favor of the employee longshoreman.
It becomes apparent that in such cases the longshoreman's action for re-
covery for unseaworthiness followed by the action of the shipowner for in-
demnity is circuitous in that the final loss falls on the employer stevedore
despite the exclusive liability provision of the Longshoremen's Act. In effect
the compensation award to the longshoreman under the Act is merely a tem-
porary advance while he is waiting for the jury to assess damages in his suit
37 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
38 Id.
39 Id. at 131.
40 G. GILMORE & 0. BLACK, supra note 2, § 6-57, at 372.
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against the shipowner.4 In such cases, the policy of the Longshoremen's Act
imposing a limited and exclusive, but absolute, compensation burden upon
stevedoring companies is completely frustrated.42 Regardless of the nature of
the duty, the employing stevedore is bearing the cost of his employee's injury
at jury-set rates rather than the statutory compensation rates.
It is suggested that, in fairness to shipowners who are not at fault but must
stand the absolute liability of unseaworthiness even though the condition was
created by the stevedore, Ryan reaches a necessary and just result. It would
seem that the real culprits in causing the defeat of the policy of the Long-
shoremen's Act are Mahnich and Sieracki. Mahnich, with help from Sieracki,
made the liability for unseaworthiness absolute and mandatory whether or not
there is negligence.4" Sieracki then extended the unseaworthiness remedy to
the longshoremen 4 and set the stage for defeat of the policy of the Longshore-
men's Act. It is interesting to note, however, that the exclusive liability policy
of the Longshoremen's Act is defeated only in a situation in which the unsea-
worthy condition was occasioned by a breach of the warranty of workmanship
by the stevedore. As seen above, the circuitous action resulting in indemnity by
the stevedore in this instance had developed what might be said to be a duty
to maintain seaworthiness on the part of the stevedore in favor of his employee.
This duty would appear to be contrary to the exclusive liability policy of the
Longshoremen's Act. Thus, in the light of the indemnity rule of Ryan, it
would seem that Mahnich and Sieracki might well be reconsidered with a view
to the policy of the Longshoremen's Act, by which Congress certainly did not
intend to make a stevedore employer absolutely liable in tort damages to maintain
the seaworthiness of a vessel for the protection of his employees.
In the meantime, however, the policy violation is avoided in any case
where the court finds that the injury was not caused by the unseaworthiness
of the vessel but rather by the "actionable negligence" of the stevedore. When
there is no unseaworthiness recovery against the shipowner, there is no in-
demnity owing from the stevedore, and the exclusive liability provisions of the
Longshoremen's Act restrict the injured employee's recovery to compensation
only. The second part of this Note will consider the distinction between action-
able or operational negligence and unseaworthiness. First it might be well to
note that in this situation the negligent stevedore might escape from all but
the compensation burden, whereas a stevedore, whose breach of warranty of
workmanlike service resulted in a condition of unseaworthiness through no
negligence of his own, would be caught up in the indemnity circle and held
liable for tort damages. It would seem that the law has developed in this area
so as to leave semantics in control to the extent that the innocent may pay
heavily while the negligent get off lightly.
41 Id. § 6-57, at 373.
42 Italia Societa v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315, 326 (1964) (dissenting opinion
of J. Black).
43 See notes 27-32 supra and accompanying text.
44 See notes 29-30 supra and accompanying text.
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II. Operational Negligence v. Instantaneous Unseaworthiness
A. The Stevedore's Role in the Creation of Unseaworthiness
As seen above, the exclusive liability policy of the Longshoremen's Act is
frustrated only in those cases where the stevedore has breached his warranty
of workmanship and an unseaworthy condition has resulted for which the
shipowner is liable and for which the shipowner in turn obtains indemnity.
It is clear, as well, that in any case where the vessel is not found unseaworthy the
cycle is broken and the. stevedore can be liable for no more than the compen-
sation award in the Longshoremen's Act. The question, then, becomes: What
acts on the part of a stevedore or his employees result in an unseaworthy vessel?"5
Defective equipment brought aboard by a stevedore was held to make
the vessel unseaworthy in Alaska Steamship Company v. Petterson,4" while
Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser4" held that use by the stevedore
of dangerous equipment already aboard also created unseaworthiness. 5 It has
also been found that the failure of a seaman or a longshoreman to conform
to the usual and customary standards of their callings constitutes unseaworthi-
ness for which the shipowner is liable if this failure causes injury.49
In Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Incorporated"0 it was made absolutely clear
that Mahnich and Sieracki were definite in holding that the character of the
duty of seaworthiness is absolute and that due diligence is not enough. 1 The
Court in overruling the doctrine that unseaworthiness liability did not attach
when the condition causing the injury was transitory in nature, 2 found that
regardless of actual or constructive knowledge of the condition on the part of
the shipowner, there would be liability for any lack of reasonable fitness that
causes injury.5 3 Unseaworthiness liability was thus completely divorced from
45 In Grillea v. United States, 232 F.2d 919, 922-23 (2d Cir. 1956), it was held that
even though the stevedores themselves had rendered a ship pro tanto unseaworthy through
their negligence, they could still recover from the vessel owner for their injuries. See Crumady
v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423, 427 '(1959) (impliedly approving of Grilleds
holding).
46 347 U.S. 396 (1954), aff'g 205 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953).
47 358 U.S. 423 (1959).
48 Id. at 427-28. In this case a safety device on a winch supplied by the ship would
not cut off the power until double the safe working load was reached. The "stevedores did
no more than bring into play the unseaworthy condition of the vessel," id. at 427, in using
the winch which with the improper safety device made the vessel pro tanto unseaworthy. The
vessel was liable for unseaworthiness and the stevedore for indemnity for breach of its warranty
of workmanlike service since it used the dangerous device that caused the injury in question.
Id. 428-29.
49 Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955); Smith v. Lauritzen, 201
F. Supp. 663 (E.D. Pa. 1962). In a subsequent appeal, acceptance of the reasoning of this
case was impliedly recognized as law, 256 F.2d 171 (3rd Cir. 1966). See also Waldron v.
Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 386 U.S. 724 (1967). Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik
Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959), where it was said: "[U]nseaworthiness extends not only to
the vessel but to the crew, [citing Boudoin] . . . .. Id. at 427.
50 362 U.S. 539 (1960). This case provides an excellent history of the development
of the concept of seaworthiness from the earliest times.
51 Id. at 549-50.
52 Cookingham v. United States, 184 F.2d 213 (3d Cir. 1950). In this case the
transitory condition of jello on an otherwise seaworthy stairway did not create unseaworthiness.
53 Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 549-50 (1960).
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concepts of negligence.5 4 In the recent case of Waldron v. Moore-McCormack
Lines, Incorporated5 this strict liability was re-emphasized, and the expanding
doctrine of unseaworthiness justified on the grounds of its broad "humanitarian
policy."5 " However, the Mitchell test of reasonable fitness, 7 along with the
statement in Morales v. Galveston" that "the isolated and completely unfore-
seeable introduction of a noxious agent from without" 59 might not make a
vessel unseaworthy, still left many questions for the courts and attorneys as to
what actions by a stevedore would create unseaworthiness. °
B. When is Negligence of the Stevedore Unseaworthiness
of the Vessel?
Remembering that unseaworthiness is traditionally a condition evidencing
a lack of reasonable fitness for the intended purpose, a major problem develops
when a longshoreman is injured due to the negligence of the stevedore. At the
present stage of development of the law, few will argue with the Petterson view
that if a stevedore negligently brings aboard defective equipment which later
injures a longshoreman, the ship is unseaworthy, i.e., not reasonably fit for the
purpose of loading or unloading cargo.
In a more difficult case, though, where, for example, a longshoreman is
injured by negligently placing his hand through a perfectly fit glass window
on the ship, the answer becomes less clear. In the hypothetical of the broken
window, no one could argue that the mere existence of a window that might
be broken is unseaworthiness. Add to the problem a fellow longshoreman who
is hit by falling glass and injured. He may argue that for a brief moment there
was an unseaworthy condition, i.e., falling glass. Then, how about the long-
shoreman who is injured three weeks later in a fall caused by the broken glass
which has been allowed to remain on deck? Surely, in regard to this last injured
worker, the ship is not reasonably fit within the definition of seaworthiness. Yet,
in the case of each of our longshoremen, the injury has been caused by the
original negligent act. Since the Supreme Court has eliminated negligence con-
cepts from unseaworthiness, how can the differing results be justified within a
workable rule?"'
In the landmark case of Grillea v. United States,2 the Second Circuit
faced this type problem which has come to be known as instantaneous unsea-
54 Id. at 550.
55 386 U.S. 724 (1967).
56 Id. at 728.
57 Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960). See text accompanying
note 33 supra.
58 370 U.S. 165 (1962).
59 Id. at 171. Here improperly fumigated grain had injured longshoremen who were
loading it in a non-ventilated hold.
60 See the discussion in Dugas v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha, 378 F.2d 271, 274-75 (5th
Cir. 1967), where the court suggests that "intended use" or foreseeability has much to do
with the reasonable fitness test of unseaworthiness. This seems to amount to re-introduction
of a limited negligence standard into the concept of unseaworthiness.
61 This hypothetical of the broken window is suggested by Judge Hays' concurring
opinion in Puddu v. Royal Netherlands S.S. Co., 303 F.2d 752, 757 '(2d Cir. 1962).
62 232 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1956).
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worthiness or actionable or operational negligence, depending upon the approach
adopted by the courts. In Grillea two members of a gang of longshoremen
placed the wrong hatch cover over a "pad-eye" so that when the longshoreman-
libellant later stepped on the cover it rocked causing him to fall and suffer in-
juries. Judge Learned Hand wrote:
[I]t is at times hard to say whether a defect in hull or gear that arises as
a momentary step or phase in the progress of work on board should be con-
sidered as an incident in a continuous course of operation, which will
fasten liability upon the owner only in case it is negligent, or as an unfit-
ness of the ship that makes her pro tanto unseaworthy....
It would be futile to try to draw any line between situations in which
the defect is only an incident in a continuous operation, and those in
which some intermediate step is to be taken as making the ship unsea-
worthy. Nevertheless, it is necessary to separate the two situations, even
though each case must turn on its particular circumstances. In the case
at bar although the libellant and his companion, Di Donna, had been
those who laid the wrong hatch cover over the "pad-ey&' (63) only a short
time before he fell, we think that enough time had elapsed to result in
unseaworthiness.64
At the outset, Judge Hand recognized the difficulty in determining the point
of time at which the negligence of a stevedore becomes unseaworthiness. He
noted that subsequent cases would turn on their facts, but in this precedent-
setting decision he seemed to look for some condition that resulted from the
negligence and that existed for at least some length of time before the injury,
or at least was separate from the negligence.
Despite the decision of the Supreme Court in Mitchell that regardless of
the short duration or recent vintage of a hazard it may still constitute unsea-
worthiness,"- an important element in the distinction between operational negli-
gence and unseaworthiness is the question of whether the negligence of the
worker causing the accident had yet made the workplace unsafe. In other
words, a key issue is whether the injury was simultaneous with the negligence.6"
Similarly, the courts added the test of whether the "active negligence" of the
longshoreman had come to rest leaving a resulting "condition" in existence.6 7
An example of the application of the operational negligence-unseaworthi-
ness distinction can be seen in Billeci v. United States" where the longshore-
63 A per curiam decision denying a petition for rehearing mentions that the opinion is
incorrect in that the wrong hatch cover was placed by fellow workers rather than the libellant
and Di Donna, but this correction makes no difference in the decision, and, if anything, makes
the facts even stronger in support of it. Id. at 925.
64 Id. at 922-23.
65 See text accompanying notes 50-54 supra.
66 Antoine v. Lake Charles Stevedores, Inc., 376 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1967); Robichaux
v. Kerr McGee Oil Indus., Inc., 376 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1967); Beeler v. Alaska Ag-
gregate Corp., 336 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1964); Blassingill v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 336 F.2d
367 (9th Cir. 1964); Billeci v. United States, 298 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1962); Puddu v. Royal
Netherlands S.S. Co., 303 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1962); Rawson v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 304 F.2d
202 '(9th Cir. 1962); Pinto v. States Marine Corp., 296 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1961).
67 Antoine v. Lake Charles Stevedores, Inc., 376 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1967); Robichaux
v. Kerr McGee Oil Indus., Inc., 376 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1967); Norfleet v. Isthmian Lines,
Inc., 355 F.2d 359 (2d Cir. 1966); Beeler v. Alaska Aggregate Corp., 336 F.2d 108 (9th
Cir. 1964); Billeci v. United States, 298 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1962).
68 298 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1962).
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man's injury was caused by a winch that came out of gear and allowed a raised
hatch cover to fall and slide into the plaintiff. It was found that the winch
was seaworthy and that it came out of gear solely due to the failure of the
operating longshoreman to use the required safety devices to lock it in gear.
The court stated:
[T]he shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness does not extend to a negligent
use by longshoremen of seaworthy appliances.
The instant case is distinguishable from both Crumady and Grillea.
This is not a case where the negligent act had terminated and an appliance
was left in an unsafe condition. As the trial court observed, the locking
pin does not remain in a fixed position during stevedoring operations, but
must be moved in and out whenever it becomes necessary to shift gears....
Plaintiff's injury was sustained by the negligent use of a seaworthy appli-
ance at the very moment of injury. As the trial court aptly said: "The
vessel was unsafe only so long as the negligence continued, whereas in
Grillea, the negligent act terminated shortly after it began, but the unsafe
situation continued to exist." 69
In contrast to this decision in Billeci, the doctrine did allow re-
covery in Beeler v. Alaska Aggregate Corporation0 where a longshoreman was
injured when a ladder slipped and he fell to the deck below. The ladder itself
was found to be seaworthy and the usual and safe way to keep it from slipping
was to have another worker hold it in place. Here, though, a walking boss and
a fellow longshoreman became confused as to who would hold the ladder for
Beeler with the result that neither did. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the trial
court's finding that the applicable law was:
Liability on the ground of unseaworthiness does not attach if the
injury was sustained by the negligent use of a seaworthy appliance at the
very moment of injury. It does attach if the negligent act has terminated
and an appliance had been left in an unsafe condition.
7 1
The trial court had found that the negligent act of the walking boss and fellow
worker that created the unsafe condition had not terminated, but rather that
it caused the unsafe condition simultaneously with the accident and injury."2
The Court of Appeals reversed saying that the legal principles had been wrongly
applied to the facts.13 The ladder did not fall due to the negligent way it was
held but rather as the result of the negligent failure to hold it prior to the acci-
dent. The negligence, according to the court, had thus come to rest before the
ladder fell and was thus an antecedent condition causing the ladder to become
unseaworthy.14
It is suggested that this is indeed a tricky distinction, and it is no wonder
that a panel in the Second Circuit went out of its way in sustaining recovery
69 Id. at 705-07.
70 336 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1964).
71 Id. at 109-10.
72 Id. at 109.
73 Id. at 109-10.
74 Id. at 110.
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in Reid v. Quebec Paper Sales & Transportation Company,5 a similar ladder
case, to technically avoid the Grillea doctrine. As was said there, "One does not
have to be unduly cynical to look askance at their distinction [operational
negligence v. unsafe condition], for every act of negligence, no matter how
short-lived, creates an unsafe condition for those exposed to it."' It went on
to characterize the test as to whether the negligence had "terminated" or come
to "rest" as being a "metaphysical inquiry."77
Despite the criticisms,"8 courts in the Second,7" Fifth ° and Ninth"1 Circuits
generally retained the Grillea distinction between operational negligence and
an unseaworthy condition negligently created, denying the ship's liability in
the former case. The statement in Billeci, "the shipowner's warranty of sea-
worthiness does not extend to a negligent use by longshoremen of seaworthy
appliances,"82 seemed to be the general rule in these circuits.
On the other hand, the Third Circuit, having been overruled once on its
transistory condition doctrine,8" has become more cautious and has joined the
Fourth Circuit8 ' in holding that improper use by stevedores of proper equip-
ment may render a ship unseaworthy."5 This seems to mean that the Grillea
distinction between operational negligence and unseaworthy condition no longer
holds sway in these circuits.8" As was said in Scott v. Isbrandtsen Company"7
and quoted in Ferrante v. Swedish American Lines:'s
In this circuit it is no longer open to question that evidence of the
negligence of the longshoremen themselves in the performance of the ship's
work and in their method of operation may present a factual issue as to
whether an unseaworthy condition is created for which the shipowner may
be held liable for injury to a longshoreman resulting from such condition.
75 340 F.2d 34 '(2d Cir. 1965).
76 Id. at 37.
77 Id.
78 Dissenting opinions that are critical of this distinction for various reasons and on
various theories have been the rule rather than the exception in the Second Circuit, e.g.,
Radovich v. Cunard S.S. Co., 364 F.2d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 1966) (dissenting opinionJ;
Puddu v. Royal Netherlands S.S. Co., 303 F.2d. 752, 754 (2d Cir. 1962) (dissenting opinion);
Pinto v. States Marine Corp., 296 F.2d 1, 8 (2d Cir. 1961) (dissenting opinion). Among
the most convincing is Judge Friendly's dissent in Skibinski v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 360
F.2d 539, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1966), pointing out that the hairsplitting decisions have led
to different results in cases where there was no "meaningful difference either in the ship's
performance or the plaintiff's desserts." Id. at 544. He also attacked cases that resulted in
indemnity from the stevedore and destruction of the policy of the Longshoremen's Act. Id.
79 Norfleet v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 355 F.2d 359 '(2d Cir. 1966); Radovich v. Cunard
S.S. Co., 364 F.2d 149, 151 (2d Cir. 1966); Skibinski v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 360 F.2d
539 (2d Cir. 1966).
80 Antoine v. Lake Charles Stevedores, Inc., 376 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1967); Dugas v.
Nippon Yusen Kaisha, 378 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1967); Robichaux v. Kerr McGee Oil Indus.,
Inc., 376 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1967).
81 Beeler v. Alaska Aggregate Corp., 336 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1964); Billeci v. United
States, 298 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1962); Rawson v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 304 F.2d 202 '(9th
Cir. 1962). See Blassingill v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 336 F.2d 367 (9th Cir. 1964).
82 Billed v. United States, 298 F.2d 703, 705-06 (9th Cir. 1962).
83 See text accompanying notes 52 and 65 supra.
84 Scott v. Isbrandtsen Co., 327 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1964).
85 Ferrante v. Swedish American Lines, 331 F.2d 571 (3d Cir. 1964); Thompson v.
Calmar S.S. Corp., 331 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1964).
86 Id.; Scott v. Isbrandtsen Co., 327 F.2d 113, 127 (4th Cir. 1964).
87 327 F.2d 113 '(4th Cir. 1964).
88 331 F.2d 571 (3d Cir. 1964).
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This is true even though the condition be transitory and without knowledge
of the ship's officers. Furthermore... in determining unseaworthiness no sig-
nificance attaches to the fact that no one complained of the alleged unsafe
condition 9 (Emphasis added.)
Both courts also made much of the Supreme Court's emphasis on the "humani-
tarian policy" of the doctrine of unseaworthiness and noted that "[t]he obvious
trend of the Supreme Court decisions is toward providing ever increasing pro-
tection for crewmen, longshoremen, and even others employed by independent
contractors who may be called upon to work aboard vessels."9
C. Mascuilli v. United States and its Effect
Regardless of the characterization of the question, i.e., whether negligent
use of seaworthy equipment by the longshoremen makes the ship unseaworthy
or whether there is an unseaworthy condition or just continuing operational
negligence, it was inevitable that the results in cases having similar factual situa-
tions were bound to vary in the different circuits and often within the same
circuit. A definitive standard from the Supreme Court seemed very necessary.9
The Second Circuit in Candiano v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Incorpo-
rated"2 attempted to analyze the recent three-sentence per curiam opinion of
the Supreme Court in Mascuilli v. United States. 3 Candiano suggests that "the
doctrine of operational negligence now seems to have been rejected by the
Supreme Court as a factor in the determination of liability" 94 and that "Grillea
and a long line of other decisions of this Court [Second Circuit] attempting to
define where operational negligence ends and unseaworthiness begins would
seem to be no longer controlling in the light of Mascuilli."95
If the Second Circuit's interpretation of Mascuilli is correct, it would seem
that the Supreme Court has laid to rest the doctrine of "operational negligence"
and has instead "sanctioned the doctrine of 'instantaneous unseaworthiness,'
so that a longshoreman may now recover for the negligence of his fellow workers
even though no unseaworthy 'condition' has been created."96 A number of
lawyers and judges have agreed with the Candiano interpretation of the
Mascuilli holding.97
89 Id. at 577; Scott v. Isbrandtsen Co., 327 F.2d 113, 125-26 (4th Cir. 1964).
90 Ferrante v. Swedish American Lines, 331 F.2d 571, 578 (3d Cir. 1964); Scott v.
Isbrandtsen Co., 327 F.2d 113, 124 (4th Cir. 1964).
91 See M. NORRIS, THE LAW OF MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES § 38, at 75-80 '(2d
ed. 1966).
92 382 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1967).
93 387 U.S. 237 (1967). The opinion stated in toto:
The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment is reversed.
Mahnich v. Southern S. S. Co., 321 U. S. 96; Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik
Fisser, 358 U. S. 423.
Mr. Justice Harlan, Mr. Justice Stewart, and Mr. Justice White are of the
opinion that certiorari should be denied.
The various stages of Mascuilli are found at: 188 F. Supp. 754 (E.D. Pa. 1960), rev'd,
313 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1963); 241 F. Supp. 354 "(E.D. Pa. 1965), aff'd, 358 F.2d 133
(3d Cir. 1966), rev'd per curiam, 387 U.S. 237 (1967).
94 Candiano v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 382 F.2d 961, 962 (2d Cir. 1967).
95 Id.
96 Jackson v. The S.S. Kings Point, No. 7583, E.D. La., November 24, 1967, p. 3.
97 Id.
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In Mascuilli the longshoreman was killed when starboard and port vangs
(opposing cables used for horizontally moving an overhead boom) became taut
simultaneously causing one of the vangs to break and whip back striking him.
In its Finding of Fact 35, the district court stated:
In summary, the Court finds that the vessel and all of its equipment
was in a seaworthy condition at all times, and remained so throughout the
entire loading operations. The accident was caused solely by the negli-
gent operation of the stevedoring crew using seaworthy equipment in such
a manner as to cause the accident to occur so instantaneously that the
Third Officer was unable to warn anyone or prevent its happening. 8
Thus according to United States Law Week and Candiano, the issue posed to
the Supreme Court was: "Does dangerous condition caused by stevedore's
negligent handling of proper equipment render vessel unseaworthy and its
owner liable for resulting injuries?"99 If this was indeed the issue decided by
the Supreme Court, it is apparent that their reversal of a judgment for the
shipowner amounts to an affirmative answer and a refutation of the Grillea doc-
trine's distinction between operational negligence and unseaworthiness.
However, the petition in the Supreme Court for certiorari by the libellant
shows that two other issues were presented to the Court.' 0 The more important
of these two,' as stated by the libellant, was:
Where the safety devices on a ship's loading gear are set at one and a
half and three times in excess of the safe working load of the ship's gear,
... was the vessel not unseaworthy and the owner liable for the death of
a longshoreman resulting from the fractured gear under the principle of
law enunciated by this Court in Crumady v. "Joachim Hendrik Fisser,"
358 U. S. 423 (1959), wherein this Court held that where a dangerous
condition due to the excess setting of the ship's safety devices is brought
into play by the negligent operation of the stevedores, the resulting in-
juries must be deemed due to the unseaworthiness of the vessel? 0 2
The district court dismissed this condition from consideration as unseaworthi-
ness on a technical argument that despite the fact the safety devices were set
at a level in excess of the safe working load of the equipment,0 3 they would
have had no application in the instant case."0 4 However, the facts remain that
98 Mascuihi v. United States, 241 F. Supp. 354, 362 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
99 Candiano v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 382 F.2d 961, 962 (2d Cir. 1967);
35 U.S.L.W. 3052, (U.S. July 26, 1966).
100 Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 2, Mascuilli v. United States, 387 U.S. 237 (1967).
101 The third issue brought to the Court's attention was based on the district court's
Conclusion of Law 17, that "[t]he longshoremen crew was not 'equal in disposition and
seamanship to the ordinary men in the calling' at the time the ninth tank was being loaded."
Mascuilli v. United States, 241 F. Supp. 354, 364 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
The petitioner argued at page 11 of his Petition for Writ of Certiorari that, as a matter
of law, this finding required the conclusion that the vessel was, for this reason alone, un-
seaworthy on the basis of Boudoin v. Lykes Brothers Steamship Corporation, 348 U.S. 336
(1955). See text accompanying note 49 supra. While the summary reversal by the Supreme
Court does not show that it acted upon this argument, there is little more reason to believe
that it meant to destroy the Grillea doctrine than to believe the Court felt this argument
controlling.
102 Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 2, Mascuilli v. United States, 387 U.S. 237 (1967).
103 Id. at 2.
104 Mascuilli v. United States, 241 F. Supp. 354, 360-61, 363-64. (E.D. Pa. 1965).
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the safety devices were set beyond the safe working load, neither operated to
cut off the power, and the strain was irrefutably excessive to the point that the
shackle actually shattered causing the accident."0 '
In Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser °'0 a boom fell injuring the
petitioner. The winch that served the boom had a cut-off safety device that
was set to shut off the current at a load twice the safe working load of the gear.
The district court found that the vessel was unseaworthy and that the steve-
dores acted in a negligent manner thereby creating an excess working load and
thus precipitating the accident. 7 In reinstating the district court's finding of
unseaworthiness, the Supreme Court said:
[T]here is ample evidence to support the finding that these stevedores did
no more than bring into play the unseaworthy condition of the vessel. The
winch - an appurtenance of the vessel - was not inherently defective
as was the rope in the Mahnich case. But it was adjusted by those acting
for the vessel owner in a way that made it unsafe and dangerous for the
work at hand. . . . The case is no different in principle from loading or
unloading cargo with cable or rope lacking the test strength for the weight
of the freight to be moved. In that case the cable or rope, in this case the
winch, makes the vessel pro tanto unseaworthy. That was the theory of
the District Court; it correctly applied the concept of unseaworthiness .... I's
The fact that the Supreme Court, in its summary reversal in Mascuilli,
cited only Crumady and Mahnich, lends credence to a belief that the Court
did not consider Mascuilli as being within the operational negligence - unsea-
worthiness problem at all. The facts were as near to being on all fours with
Crumady as they could be so that it is possible that the Court reversed in such
a summary manner on the belief that Crumady was controlling on the facts,
and that the Court intended to express no opinion on the Grillea doctrine.
D. Conclusion
It becomes evident, as at least one district court has pointed out,"0 ' that
105 Petitioner's Reply Brief for Certiorari at 2, Mascuilli v. United States, 387 U.S. 237
(1967). The district court's finding was based primarily on the fact that safety cut-offs
will not trip when the winch control is in a paying-out position as was the after port winch
at the time of the accident. However, it appears that the tightline condition was caused
by the fact that the forward starboard vang had not been slackened. We are given no
insight by the district court as to whether the safety cut-off on this winch might have avoided
the accident by applying the winch cut-off before the tightline condition worsened to the
point of accident.
106 358 U.S. 423 (1959).
107 Id. at 425-26.
108 Id. at 427-28.
109 [W]e are plagued by a certain amount of doubt in light of the authorities relied
upon by the Supreme Court in Mascuilli and by the fact that Mascuilli was only a per
curiam opinion of the briefest possible nature. Consequently, we are not prepared
to hold, at this time, that this [destruction of the operational negligence - un-
seaworthiness distinction] was Mascuillis effect.
The different possibilities of Mascuillis effect, if any, upon the law operates as
a signal to this Court to proceed with caution in this area in the absence of further
elucidating opinions from a higher and binding source.
Jackson v. The S.S. Kings Point, No. 7583, E.D. La., November 24, 1967, pp. 3-4.
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the effect of Mascuilli is far from certain. It may, as Candiano suggests, elim-
inate the doctrine of "operational negligence" and in its place substitute one
of "instantaneous unseaworthiness," so that a longshoreman may now recover
for the negligence of his fellow workers even though no unseaworthy "condi-
tion" has been created.11 On the other hand, Mascuilli may preserve the un-
seaworthiness- negligence dichotomy, but in so doing it may have pushed
unseaworthiness to its furthest possible limit so that it will be presumed to exist
when there is any question at all as to whether or not a "condition" caused the
longshoreman's injuries. Recovery would thus be denied only when it is crystal
clear that operational negligence was the cause.11 As suggested above, a third
alternative is that Mascuilli may leave the operational negligence - unseaworthy
condition struggle right where it had been previously.
If Mascuilli allows recovery regardless of the existence of an unseaworthy
condition, and to a lesser degree if it only creates a presumption of an unsea-
worthy condition, it will have done much to eliminate the unfairness and con-
fusion spawned by the inconsistent decisions under the Grillea doctrine.' No
longer will an actively negligent stevedore escape indemnity liability, while the
faultless stevedore is obliged to pay because he has brought a latently defective
appliance aboard."1 This consideration brings into play the real effect of the
"holding" in Mascuilli, that is, if the ship is unseaworthy when the cause of
an injury is solely stevedore negligence, the remaining thread of the limited
liability provisions of the Longshoremen's Act is broken. When the stevedore's
negligence is responsible for the unseaworthiness, he ultimately bears the dam-
ages through indemnity. The doctrine of unseaworthiness, as applied to long-
shoremen, has thus become a ruse for getting around the policy of Congress in
the Longshoremen's Act.
This development has come about through the holdings of Mahnich,
Sieracki, Ryan, and Mascuilli. Each case considered alone, especially in light of
the overriding "humanitarian policy" appears just. Together, however, they
create a circuitous form of action that frustrates the congressional policy of the
Longshoremen's Act just as much as a direct holding against it. The Supreme
Court has backed itself into a round corner and Mascuilli may shut the door.
Even if it does not, it is time for Congress to re-evaluate the effectiveness of its
policy limiting the liability of stevedores.
John E. Amerman
110 Id. at 2-3.
111 Id. at 3.
112 See id. at 4. Radbvich v. Cunard S.S. Co., 364 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1966) (dis-
senting opinion); Skibinski v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 360 F.2d 539 (2d Cir. 1966) (dissenting
opinion).
113 Italia Societa v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315 (1964).
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